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Sceptical Responses in Early Modern Plays
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The Malcontent and Middleton’s The Revenger’s Tragedy
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Abstract Defined for the first time by Sir Thomas Elyot as a «secte of Phylosophers, whiche af-
firmed nothynge» (1538), the term ‘scepticism’ appears in all its variants only too rarely in the drama 
of the period. Chadwyck Healey databases (Early English Books Online and Literature Online) re-
cord only four different occurrences (Tomkis 1607; Jonson 1640; Cartwright 1651; Massinger 1655), 
in a span of time which runs from 1550 to 1655, although scepticism as a way of participating in, and 
responding to, life is registered on the London stages as an increasingly popular critical attitude. 
Vindice’s «I’m in doubt whether I’m myself or no» is evidence of that suspension of judgment which 
is envisaged by the sceptics as the only viable answer in a world governed by the relativism of human 
knowledge. Against a theoretical and philosophical background which investigates the relationship 
between self-knowledge and scepticism, the article looks at how this early modern revival of scepti-
cism – so profoundly influenced by the translation of Montaigne’s essays – can couple with, and go 
beyond, an emergent awareness of inwardness, as the one hinted at in Marston’s The Malcontent 
and Middleton’s The Revenger’s Tragedy. In particular, the essay examines the interplay between 
the revengers’ responses to the adoption of different masks and the dictum of a philosophy which 
demands the deferment of any epistemological verdict. A discussion of the rhetorical strategies 
which better testify to the contradictions at the heart of this ontological impasse will then follow.
Summary 1. Identifying (sceptical) selves in early modern literature. — 2. Tragicomical Self-
knowledge in John Marson’s The Malcontent. — 3. Questioning the Self in Thomas Middleton’s 
The Revenger’s Tragedy: The Knowledge of Self-doubt.
The more I learnt the more I learn to doubt. 
(John Marston, What You Will, 2.2.153)
We must know how to distinguish and separate ourselves 
from our public charges: every one of us plays two parts, two 
persons; the one strange and apparent, the other proper and 
essential […] A man must serve and make use of the world 
such as he finds it; in the meantime, he must likewise consid-
er it as a thing estranged from itself, know how to keep and 
carry himself apart, and to communicate himself to his own 
trustie good, howsoever things fall out with himself. 
(Pierre Charron, Of Wisdom) 
1 Identifying (sceptical) selves in early modern literature 
Defined for the first time by Sir Thomas Elyot as a «secte of Phylosophers, 
whiche affirmed nothynge» (1538, n.p.), and thus antedating the OED’s 
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first record of the noun in 1587, ‘sceptici’ appears in all its variant spellings 
and forms only too rarely in the drama of the early modern period, despite 
being widely employed in prose and poetry. Chadwyck Healey databases 
(Early English Books Online and Literature Online) register only five dif-
ferent occurrences of the term in plays between 1550 and 1655: in two 
comedies, Thomas Tomkis’s Lingua (1607) and Ben Jonson’s The Devil is 
an Ass (1640); a masque, William Davenant’s Britannia Triumphans (1638); 
a tragicomedy, William Cartwright’s The Lady Errant (1651); and a comi-
cal history, Philip Massinger’s The Guardian (1655). Although the term is 
rarely employed by playwrights, scepticism as a way of participating in, 
and of responding to, life is registered on the London stages as an increas-
ingly popular critical attitude, which paradoxically finds its most intriguing 
ambassadors in the tragedies of the period where the term never appears. 
This revival of scepticism, reinvigorated by the social, political, religious, 
and scientific turmoil of the age (see Spolsky 2001, pp. 62-63), as well as by 
the literary patrimony of Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s Essays (1603), 
and by the works of More, Sextus, and Erasmus, couples with an emergent 
awareness of inwardness, which is hinted at in Marston’s The Malcontent 
(Kay 1998) and in Middleton’s The Revenger’s Tragedy (MacDonald 2007), 
two plays which have received scant attention in discussions of sceptical 
selves, with the exception of Hamlin’s treatment of the topic in The Mal-
content and, more in general, in Middleton (Hamlin 2005). 
As scepticism thus surfaces in the period, one may wonder how the 
revengers’ response to the adoption of different disguises functions, if at 
all, according to the dictum of a philosophy that demands the deferment 
of any epistemological verdict and how the genre of the play may variously 
affect the playwrights’ ways of dealing with this subject. From a dramatic 
perspective, we also need to know which rhetorical strategies testify to 
the contradictions at the heart of what becomes an ontological impasse 
(‘who am I?’) and how paradoxes inherent in the expression of the self 
may illuminate our understanding of early modern plays’ engagement with 
scepticism. 
Literary scholars, as well as cultural historians, have recently discerned 
new scenarios on the relation between the private and the public sphere 
in the everyday experience of the early modern world. Words such as ‘sub-
ject’, ‘subjectual’, ‘individual’, ‘identity’, and ‘inwardness’ have therefore 
emerged as a new vocabulary to define the concept of Renaissance self-
hood. These terms, however useful, may on occasion clash with the devel-
oping terminology of an age whose responses to questions on the nature 
of being inevitably differ from ours. 
It is probably for this reason that readings of early modern plays may 
tend to privilege Stephen Greenblatt’s coinage: ‘self-fashioning’. In his in-
fluential New Historicist Renaissance Self-Fashioning, the word has come 
to suggest a denial of any independent agency on the part of the individual 
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in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For Greenblatt, selfhood is 
fashioned as «the ideological product of the relations of power in a particu-
lar society» (2005, p. 256). This presumed relational subjectivity, strongly 
informed by Foucauldian overtones, has offered new ways of «specifying 
the Subject» in a period when, according to Condren, «human social and 
moral identity, as opposed to material identity, was presented and pre-
sumably conceived not in terms of selves or individuals but personae […] 
the moral world was overwhelmingly articulated as comprised of offices» 
(Condren 2006, pp. 35-36; see also Barker 1984). 
Despite the fact that our understanding of Renaissance identity and 
culture has greatly benefited from these studies, a large group of scholars 
have been increasingly inclined to suspect New Historicist approaches 
as, borrowing John Jeffries Martin’s words, «hold[ing] them [Renaissance 
identities] up as mirrors to ourselves, [so that] what we see depends al-
most entirely upon where we stand». Greenblatt’s theory has in fact been 
charged with anachronism because of his attempt to define the «glim-
merings of the postmodern self» (Martin 2004, p. 7). Indeed, the same 
uneasiness with Greenblatt’s assumptions has also informed the critically 
acclaimed Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance, where 
Katharine Eisaman Maus accuses that «the new-historicist critique insists 
that the ‘self ’ is not independent or prior to its social context. Yet that 
critique often seems to assume that once this dependence is pointed out, 
inwardness simply vaporizes» (1995, p. 28). Although she agrees with some 
of the arguments offered by these postmodern readings, Maus believes 
that a preoccupation with a rhetoric of inwardness and privacy is manifest 
in Renaissance theatre, which investigates this «sense of discrepancy be-
tween inward disposition and outward appearance» (p. 13). Early modern 
identity has therefore become the focus of attention on problems of rep-
resentations of the self as well as «the relation of one’s inner experience 
to one’s experience in the world» (Martin 2004, p. 15), as Geoff Baldwin 
also argues: 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, there was a body of writers 
who developed ideas of the self which drew upon stoicism and ideas of 
office, but went beyond both of these. They pointed forward to more 
individualistic moral theories, as well as backwards to the conception of 
the individual as a performer of a variety of roles. (Baldwin 2001, p. 364)
Against this critical background, which tends to analyse early seventeenth-
century English plays in relation to an emergent awareness of identity as 
a conflictual site between private and public selves in the drama of the 
period, this paper argues instead that early modern investigations of the 
self may also be informed by literary and cultural traditions of scepti-
cism and that the resulting different degrees of self-knowledge achieved 
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by the revengers through their use of masks and disguise are variously 
expressed according to the generic requirements of the play considered. 
Even though it is too early to treat early modern characters as examples 
of the individualism one associates with Hobbes or with Milton’s Satan, 
the revengers of this period can in fact be discerned as products of a 
discussion on self-examination. In an age where, as John Donne famously 
put it in his An Anatomy of the World (1611), «the new philosophy calls 
all in doubt» (Serpieri, Bigliazzi 2009, l. 205), the disguises adopted by 
these characters become means through which the experience of ‘knowing 
(one) self ’ is structured around negotiated inner and outer conflicts and, 
as in the case of the tragedies, may paradoxically produce doubt in a new, 
emergent reconfiguration of the coordinates in the other relation. The 
masks of the malcontent or the knave, for instance, perfectly exploit the 
gap between external representation and internal truth in a metatheatrical 
game where the self-proclaiming revenger, suspicious of the unreliability 
of appearances and assuming a certain degree of self-knowledge, has to 
mould a new social identity. Functional to the reacquisition of a former 
public role in the tragicomedy, this cognitive process, which is here inves-
tigated through the lens of early modern scepticism, favours in the tragic 
revenger a new perception of his own interiority, which undermines his 
assumed self-knowledge. 
2 Tragicomical Self-knowledge in John Marson’s The Malcontent
By offering an interesting perspective on the conflicts between inward 
observation and outward representation in early modern drama, Duke 
Altofronto epitomises the revenger’s struggle with the adoption of a mask: 
«Oh God, how loathsome this toying is to me, that a duke should be forced 
to fool it! Well, stultorum plena suntomnia; better play the fool lord, than to 
be the fool lord» (5.3.41-44). Performed between 1602 and 1604, The Mal-
content is the only play of the period where the malcontent persona – self-
consciously performed by the protagonist to achieve his own personal 
revenge and recognised as a codified cultural type by the other characters 
on stage – is given the status of a character in a play. In this tragicomedy, 
Malevole, Altofronto’s alter-ego, is a sceptic who can «give his judgement 
free», as in Richard Brathwaite’s definition of the type in his 1615 Strap-
pado for the Divell (quoted in Hamlin 2005, p. 98). That in Brathawaite 
the «scepticke» comes to define something different from what we have 
encountered so far testifies to the polisemic nature of a term that may 
refer to either the doubters (in the Phyrronian fashion) or someone who, 
with his opinions, «do [sic] small harme to mens integrity», as in Marston’s 
play (quoted in Hamlin 2005, p. 98). Malevole is in fact presented as con-
sistently satirical in his language and attitude (Peter 1956; Kernan 1959; 
Nigri. Sceptical Responses in Early Modern Plays 121
English Literature, 1, 1, 2014, pp. 117-130 ISSN 2420-823X
Axelrad 1955) and content to act the fool and to be taken to be one. His 
malcontent credentials are limited to the fact that he casts himself as an 
outsider and thinks badly of the world. 
Criticism has long debated the relationship between Altofronto and Ma-
levole, speculating on the different degrees of contamination between the 
two and, eventually, agreeing on taking the deposed duke as the real mal-
content of the play’s title who adopts his fake malcontent persona in order 
to regain the power and status he has lost. On this subject, T.F. Wharton 
claims that «disguise serves as more than a convenient trick. It involves a 
definite loss of the habits, values, and restraints of one’s normal identity. 
It frees the disguiser to do things which would be otherwise inconceivable, 
as he in a sense becomes what he poses as» (1988, p. 24; on the notion of 
self-alienation and self-concealment, see Gomez 1991, p. 52; Lanier 1987; 
Clark 1983; and Kinney 2005, p. 416). Malevole’s cynical persona is there-
fore absorbed into the duke’s, as evidenced in the play’s closing moments 
when the malcontent alarmingly remains on stage wearing Altofronto’s 
clothes. 
William Hamlin’s reading of the play reinforces Wharton’s position since 
he believes that «Altofronto enjoys his role as Malevole, and thus appears 
to be Malevole in some sense worth considering; it follows from this that 
if he is not precisely ‘intrapped’ in the role, the role nonetheless functions 
as a part of him – an extension or development, perhaps» (2005, p. 188). 
Hamlin, however, goes beyond conflating two characters in one to argue 
that Altofronto/Malevole is actually 
practic[ing] in utramque partem argumentation but conclud[ing] that 
both sides are true. He thus follows a sceptical trajectory to the extent 
that he entertains ‘cross’d opinions’ and refuses to choose between 
them, but he abandons the trajectory in departing from the Pyrrhonian 
principle of non-assertion. Instead of ‘A, but not-A, therefore neither’, 
he presents us with ‘A, but not-Α, therefore both’ (2005, p. 189). 
That the disguise becomes part of the disguiser remains, of course, a 
critical speculation rather than an element of a plot where the donned 
mask, in order to be a successful tool for revenge, has to distinguish itself 
from its bearer, despite sharing with him several attitudes. A fter all, as 
Dzelzainis states, following Francis Bacon’s Of Simulation and Dissimula-
tion, «to be open and truthful (or apertus et veraxor libera e vera) is in fact 
the best way to render oneself and one’s dissimulation ‘almost invisible’» 
(2000, p. 238). Hence, although Malevole’s denunciation of the dukedom 
is Altofronto’s denunciation of the corrupted Genoa, the different social 
roles of the characters (a malcontent and a former Duke) help preserve 
the scope of the planned revenge: interestingly, as long as Altofronto is 
invisible, Malevole’s invectives are not perceived as a real danger to the 
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constituted authority. 
However, what is really at stake here is not so much the ways in which 
Altofronto’s identity is perceived as the duke’s awareness of a gap be-
tween his private self (variously adulterated by his public persona as 
former duke) and the new public mask that he now creates for himself. 
Altofronto is in fact aware of the importance of representation in order to 
manipulate the others – «inconstant people | Love many princes merely 
for their faces | And outward shows» (5.6.139-141) – and he seems con-
stantly in control of the assumed role, as is evident in the stage direc-
tion «Bilioso entering, Malevole shifteth his speech» (1.4). Following the 
esse est percipi dictum (to be is to be perceived), the revenger forges a 
persona (here a malcontent) according to the characteristics that society 
would impose on that specific figure, thus demonstrating an ability to 
interpret the ways in which the others perceive the malcontent and forge 
him discursively as well as the ability to undergo a certain degree of self-
examination. The mask of the malcontent becomes therefore the arena 
where the tension between socially constructed figures and self-conscious 
reflection takes place, where the ‘being’ versus ‘seeming’ topos, one of 
the «literary paradigms of early modern scepticism» listed by Hamlin, is 
made manifest (2005, p. 124; see also pp. 124-137). As Malevole states: 
«Oh, my disguise fools him most powerfully. | For that I seem a desper-
ate malcontent» (3.3.33-34; my emphasis). Interestingly, it is the old 
panderess of the play, Maquerelle, who also relentlessly comments upon 
the same topos by catechising her interlocutors on the public exercise 
of honesty: «Have you the art to seem honest?» (2.4.24; my emphasis) 
and «Honesty is but an art to seem so» (5.3.12; my emphasis). And yet, 
Altofronto’s responsiveness to the conflict between outward represen-
tation and intimate understanding is informed by a more philosophical 
tone, which he exhibits also in lecturing a shocked Pietro who has just 
discovered her wife’s sexual affairs: 
Pietro: All is damnation, wickedness extreme; there is no faith in 
man. 
Malevole: In none but usurers and brokers, they deceive no man; men 
take ’em for blood-suckers, and so they are. Now, God deliver me 
from my friends […] there’s nothing perfect in it [the world] but 
extreme, extreme calamity, such as comes yonder. (4.4.16-31) 
In this exchange, the two dukes perfectly fulfil another of Hamlin’s liter-
ary paradigms of early modern scepticism, «that which develops from a 
collective sense of human weakness and mental frailty, [which] may be 
explicitly accounted for by reference to the Fall» (2005, p. 124). Human 
defectiveness and insufficiency become, therefore, the leitmotif of a play 
where knowledge is damnation, as Pietro’s cue perfectly epitomises: 
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Oh, would I ne’er had known 
My own dishonour! Good God, that men should
Desire to search out that which, being found, kills all 
Their joy of life! To taste the tree of knowledge 
And then be driven from out Paradise! (3.114-118)
The fact that the play’s epistemological scepticism is voiced by a malcon-
tent (the Duke in disguise), a usurper (Pietro), and an old panderess can 
be seen as a further signal of Marston’s distinctive way of shaping the 
satirical tone of his tragicomedy. 
If, as William Hamlin rightly asserts, «scepticism is less a school of 
thought than a temper of mind: a set of characteristic mental attitudes and 
practices» (2005, p. 5), then this play resonates with sceptical preoccupa-
tions in the very references to the unreliability of appearances (seeming 
versus being) and to the assertion of human weakness and insufficiency, 
as pungently articulated in the epilogue to the play: «He that knows most, 
knows most how much he wanteth» (l. 18). On the contrary, the Phyrronian 
lesson (the «A, but not-A, therefore neither») does not inform Altofronto’s 
response to the adoption of the mask: the Duke’s performance of the mal-
content is never translated in the disguiser’s suspension of judgement de-
termined by a new perception of his (double) self (as it is in The Revenger’s 
Tragedy). The camouflage does not provide Altofronto with anything but 
his lost authority and the consequent recovery of a former public identity 
which, in this play, coherently merges with the idea that the Duke already 
possesses of himself. And it is perhaps for this reason that, once regained 
his power and despite wearing Malevole’s clothes, the revenger never 
comments on his disguise. 
3 Questioning the Self in Thomas Middleton’s The Revenger’s Tragedy: 
The Knowledge of Self-doubt
If in The Malcontent Altofronto’s disguise is not really functional to the 
disguiser’s reconsideration of ‘who he is’, the mask being merely a means 
to regain social power, in The Revenger’s Tragedy the guises occasion-
ally worn by Vindice (Piato and Hippolito’s discontented brother) do offer 
the revenger a prismatic range of identities that urge him to question 
himself – by questioning his own  self. I have elsewhere explored how this 
game of identities works in The Revenger’s Tragedy (Nigri 2011 and 2014), 
but here I want to investigate Vindice’s sceptical responses to the masks 
and to a game which seems to escape containment and control on the part 
of the disguiser. Vindice’s «O, I’m in doubt | Whether I’m myself or no!» 
(4.4.24-25) can therefore be read as one of the character’s many capitu-
lations to a world where revenge does no longer lead to the reconstruc-
English Literature, 1, 1, 2014, pp. 117-130
124 Nigri. Sceptical Responses in Early Modern Plays
ISSN 2420-823X
tion of a renewed moral and political order and where the suspension of 
judgment envisaged by the sceptics offers the only viable response to a 
universe governed by the relativism of human knowledge. 
If in Marston’s play the audience is never involved in Altofronto’s decision 
to wear a mask – as the play starts, we are introduced to Malevole, and it is 
through him that we come to know Altofronto, the disguiser –, Middleton’s 
tragedy makes the audience participate in Vindice’s escalating rethinking 
of himself through the different roles which he happens to perform. In the 
revenger’s opening monologue (the only one in the whole tragedy), in fact, 
he says nothing about camouflage: Vindice only announces his intentions to 
revenge, its motive (the murder of his betrothed Gloriana), and the objects of 
his vengeance («four exc’llent characters», 1.1.5). It is only later in the scene 
that the occasion to put his thoughts into practice arrives: Lussurioso, the 
Duke’s son, is looking for «some strange-digested fellow forth | Of ill-con-
tented nature, either disgraced | In former times or by new grooms displaced 
| Since his stepmother’s nuptial» (1.1.76-79). Vindice grabs an opportunity 
he cannot miss. Despite his pronouncement that he will «put on that knave 
for once» (1.1.93), the revenger’s ability to conceive his disguise as ‘other’ 
from himself is only occasional. In this tragedy, the act of ‘putting on’ the 
mask soon transmutes into ‘being’ that new mask, as Vindice does not fail to 
note: «Brother I’ll be that strange composed fellow» (1.1.96; my emphasis). 
In a play where the disguise can no longer be seen as a mere instrument for 
revenge, seeming turns into being. The ‘seem’ of the revenger in Martson’s 
tragicomedy («For that I seem a desperate malcontent», 3.3.34; my empha-
sis) becomes the ‘be’ of the revenger in Middleton’s tragedy. 
The objectification of the mask as something distinctive from the dis-
guiser’s self («I’ll quickly turn into another», 1.1.134) is hardly convinc-
ing in Middleton’s work; in fact the revenger increasingly loses control 
over a performance which, to his fear, he cannot really master. Vindice’s 
uneasiness and anxiety about role-playing are sharply voiced in his dia-
logue with Hippolito, where he asks: «What brother, am I far enough from 
myself?» (1.3.1). The same fear pugnaciously reappears in the second act 
when, during his performance as Piato, he addresses Lussurioso in his own 
voice: «Vindice: My lord. || Lussurioso: Who’s that?» (2.2. 39). Conceiv-
ably providing a moment of comic relief in the tragedy, what we are deal-
ing with here is a volatile self which, as it spirals out of Vindice’s power, 
overshadows the role performed, thus blurring the distinction between the 
representation of another public persona and that «inward heart» (3.5.9) 
Vindice attempts to preserve. And in fact, despite the overall success of 
his performance, the tragedy makes it difficult to distinguish Vindice’s 
«inward heart» from the masks which he assumes, as demonstrated by the 
character’s increasing pleasure derived by his role and the punishments 
increasingly enjoying the role and the punishments which he inflicts on 
people: the attempts to prostitute Gloriana and Gratiana and the progres-
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sively indiscriminate murders which he is now ready to commit («As fast 
as they peep up let’s cut ’em down», 3.5.220). 
The ephemerality of the self in a tragedy, where the revenger’s own per-
sonality is thinned down into that of his mask, is indeed a concern shared by 
many characters in the play. Characters constantly interrogate themselves 
or the others about lost and forgotten selves, substituted selves, and selves 
that demand reconfirming. The topic of forgetting one(self) is not new to 
this period. The 1608 English translation of Charron’s De La Sagesse (1601; 
translated into English as Of Wisdome) also registers the age’s anxiety re-
garding self-knowledge: «Thou forgetest thy self, and losest thy self about 
outward things; thou betrayest and disrobest thy self; thou lookest alwaies 
before thee; gather thy self unto thy self, and shut up thy self within thy 
self: examine, search, know thyself» (1608, p. 2; my emphasis). The same 
insistence on losing and forgetting oneself is one of the recurrent tropes of 
the play: Lussurioso consents to «forget [himself] in private» (1.3.38) – here 
with the meaning of temporarily disregarding his social rank; Hippolito fears 
to «lose ourselves» (4.2.199); and Vindice accuses his mother to «uncivilly 
forget [her]self» (4.4.19). In Lussurioso and Vindice’s examples, the fear of 
forgetting or losing the self becomes a fear of invalidating the social iden-
tity of, both, the son of the Duke and the mother. In other words, the self is 
persistently mistaken here for the public role held by these characters, as 
when, spurred by Hippolito to remember their roles in the revenge («Oh 
brother, you forgot our business», 4.4.83), Vindice dreams of an ideal hu-
man condition where «man’s happiest when he forgets himself» (4.4.85; see 
also 2.5.29). With this statement, one of the most powerful in the tragedy, 
Middleton seems to recuperate that sceptical trope of the inadequateness 
of men also explored by Marston in the same years. 
If in the case of Gratiana her self is one with her role as mother when 
long as she protects daughter from prostitution, then Castiza’s incredulity 
in the face of her mother’s eventually pushing her towards it, stigmatises 
the woman as being not only lost («Pray, did you see my mother? Which 
way went she? | Pray God I have not lost her», 2.1.157-158) but also other 
than herself: «Why, are you she? | The world’s so changed, one shape into 
another, | It is wise child now that knows her mother» (2.1.160-162). The 
daughter’s reflection on her mother’s transformation suggests that one 
‘lost being’ (being a mother) is replaced with another, opposite ‘being’ (be-
ing a pimp), as evidenced in the following dialogue where Castiza voices 
her dismay at her mother’s suggestion that she ‘must’ become Lussurioso’s 
mistress: 
Castiza: Mother, come from that poisonous woman there. 
Mother: Where? 
Castiza: Do you not see her? She’s too inward, then. (2.1.232-234)
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Gratiana, in other words, is seen by Castiza as ‘another’ Gratiana – «Are 
not you she» (4.4.127) – and the identity split she senses in her is signifi-
cantly translated into a figure of pronominal equivocation similar to diaph-
ora and contiguous to paradox (on the metalogic function of diaphora see 
Bigliazzi 2011, p. 136]. The play acclaims, therefore, the definitive collapse 
of the unified self of humanist tradition, as further testified to by the mu-
tability of selves (and identities) depending on role-playing. This emerges, 
for example, when the old Duke suspects his son of treason («This boy, 
that should be myself after me, | Would be myself before me», 2.3.19-20), 
or when Lussurioso perceives of his self through the office he will hold 
(«If e’er I live to be myself, I’ll thank you», 3.2.4), or when Dondolo makes 
sharp remarks on his own striving «would strive a little to show [him]self 
in [his] place» (2.1. 20-21). 
Demanding confirmation on ‘who I am’ is another specific concern of 
this tragedy. The characters’ destabilising sense of their selves (and their 
roles) is expressed in the rhetorical questions of Gratiana to his daughter 
(«Am I not your mother?», 4.4.8) and of Lussurioso to vindice and the no-
bles, respectively («Am I a lord for nothing» and «Am not I duke?»; 5.1.62 
and 5.3.19). By demanding confirmation of their roles, these characters 
demonstrate a concern with the way their authority is perceived by oth-
ers. As Sylvia Adamson points out,«‘Who (or what) am I?’ and ‘Who (or 
what) are you?’ are asked repeatedly by protagonists for whom the unity 
or distinctness of the categories of personal self and social role has become 
a pressing issue, imposed by a sudden imperative demand either for self-
knowledge or for knowledge of the other» (2010, p. 64). 
Vindice, on the contrary, never asks ‘who am I?’ and, from the third 
act of the tragedy on, he assertively declares his identity as a revenger to 
those characters who, as the dying old Duke and his dying son, know him 
as either Piato or Hippolito’s «discontented brother» (4.2.35): «’Tis I, ’tis 
Vindice, ’tis I» (3.5.167) and «And I am he» (5.3.79). Arguably, these asser-
tions must be read more as sadistic and instrumental to his own revenge 
than as an answer to his reflections upon the identity game. It is, instead, 
in Vindice’s joke – «O, I’m in doubt | Whether I’m myself or no» (4.4.24-
25) – that, as pointed out by MacDonald P. Jackson in his edition of the play, 
Vindice «raises a deeper question about his true identity [provided that he 
has one] than [he] intends» (2007, p. 583). Failure to gain a definitive ho-
mogeneous sense of his own identity and an emergent alertness to a more 
sophisticated and complex self-knowledge is also evidenced in Vindice’s 
final statement when, seized by guards and ready to be executed for an 
excessively violent revenge and for constituting a danger to the new order, 
he affirms that «’Tis time to die when we are ourselves our foes» (5.3.109; 
see also 4.1.61). Middleton’s revenger fails where Marston’s succeeds be-
cause, while Altofronto seems to some extent aware of the coherence of his 
own personality and always in control of his performance as a malcontent, 
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Vindice misses the opportunity to direct the action of his own revenge with 
some distance from his camouflage: his «inward heart» (3.5.9), in other 
words, indiscriminately flows into the public mask he has created, thus 
producing an identitary friction between what he thought he was and what 
he thinks he is now. As Geoff Baldwin pertinently points out: 
In order to present a public persona […], it was important not to put 
one’s whole self into this persona, so that the individual could not be 
described by referring to the sum of duties or offices held. Something 
unique had to be retained that could not be crushed, […], by the de-
struction of those other persona. Not only this, but the self which was 
reserved had to be capable of judgement, so that it could discern the 
deception of the world and direct the operation of one or more persona. 
This made it possible to act in flawed world, and remain true to oneself 
and therefore potentially free. (2001, pp. 363-364) 
Vindice, on the contrary, cannot be ‘free’ simply because he cannot remain 
true to himself without discharging the masks which he progressively 
assumes and which, paradoxically, are now part of himself, as suggested 
by Vindice’s reply to Hippolito’s diaphoric «you’re yourself» in the scene 
where the revenger ‘disguises’ as the discontented Vindice Lussurioso 
assumes to know: 
Hippolito: So, so, all’s as it should be; you’re yourself.
Vindice: How that great villain puts me to my shifts! (4.2.1-2)
However, in this complex short-circuit of roles, the revenger does gain what 
we may define as a performative self-knowledge: through the adoptions 
of several roles, the disguiser achieves a certain degree of understanding 
of himself, which he now expresses in sceptical argument. The only ac-
cessible self-knowledge which Vindice can access is, in fact, self-doubt, 
in the fashion of Pyrrhonian investigation of a truth which is impossible 
to claim with certainty (as opposed to the Academic philosophers who, 
according to Sextus, negate human knowledge). Vindice’s suspension of 
judgment between the «we» perceived as both «ourselves» and «our en-
emies» (5.3.109) substantiates the sarcastic ‘doubt’ expressed in his state-
ment – «O, I’m in doubt | Whether I’m myself or no» (4.4.24-25) – where the 
revenger is not simply making fun of the performative multiple personae. 
Middleton’s construction of self-doubt in The Revenger’s Tragedy could 
also be linked to the notion of selfhood propounded by Calvin, especially in 
view of his uncompromising separation of a hidden, spiritual self from an 
outer, social one (Stachniewski 1991; see also Cox 2007). The play, however, 
seems to draw more consistently upon the same philosophical context from 
which Montaigne’s «Du Repentir» nourishes itself. According to Luiz Eva’s 
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reading of the French essayist’s introductory passage, Montaigne argues 
that «the way in which different changes overlap leaves us without bench-
marks by which to determine what is true. […] Insofar as we cannot tell if 
our changes are properly changes of what we are ourselves, or changes 
due to exterior causes, we cannot take these changes as representing 
knowledge of the self» (Eva 2012, pp. 78-79). 
Likewise, at the end of the play, Vindice is forced to reconsider his own 
self, to borrow Fingarette’s vocabulary on self-deception, as a «community 
of subselves» (quoted in Cox 2007, p. 11), all simultaneously dissenting 
and – somehow at the same time – all true, thus differing from Montaigne’s 
impossibility to define truth. Vindice’s ontological and epistemological 
understanding is prompted by this very coexistence of the masks within 
himself. On the other end of the spectrum is, instead, Gratiana’s response 
to an identity game, which can only be possible in an asynchronous time-
frame. Her resurrection as a loving mother is in fact possible only in the 
moment she rejects her other role (the pimp), as she does not fail to rec-
ognise: «’Tis unfruitful, held tedious, to repeat what’s past. | I’m now your 
present mother» (4.4.132-113; my emphasis). There is no ontological gain 
deriving from the change of roles: she can be either one or the other. 
The revenger thus appears as the only one able to achieve some renewed 
knowledge of his own presence in the world. His masks offer him the oc-
casion to transform himself and, in the process of (re)presenting himself 
as ‘other’, to embrace, as a palimpsest, all his previous selves and, at the 
same time, to doubt them all. Self-doubt is in fact the price to pay in order 
to gain knowledge, and the tragedy ends with the character astray in the 
face of an unsolvable instability at the roots of his own being. 
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